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Abstract
The article presents an analysis of welfare effects in Slovenia, an analysis of supple-
mentary pension insurance in Slovenia and an analysis of the effects of the pension fund 
deficit on the sustainability of Slovenian public finances. Stress was placed upon varying 
the parameters of the current Slovenian pension system and introducing mandatory su-
pplementary pension insurance in Slovenia. It has been established that while young ge-
nerations and new generations will lose from the pension reform, even complete imple-
mentation of the reform might not be sufficient to compensate for unfavourable demo-
graphic developments. The volume of supplementary pension saving is insufficient at pre-
sent in Slovenia to compensate the deterioration of rights from the first pension pillar. 
Not only is the participation in the (voluntary) second pillar insufficient, but, especially, 
the premia are too low. The level of the expected deficit of the PAYG-financed state pen-
sion fund seems to be worrying, though a higher activity level among the elderly would 
subsequently increase the volume of contributions to the first pension pillar, thus also re-
ducing the state pension fund deficit.
Keywords: general equilibrium models, PAYG, pension system, supplementary pen-
sion saving, sustainability of public finances, Slovenia, welfare analysis.
1 Introduction
Economic sustainability of social security systems is under severe pressure nowadays 
due to ageing caused by a decreasing fertility rate, increasing life expectancy as well as to 322
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an increasing share of recipients of social benefits, and a decreasing proportion of the acti-
ve population (cf. OECD, 2000; European Commission, 2001). These are the reasons for 
an anticipated increase in traditional social security benefits and the introduction of new 
types of old-age insurance. One of the key topics of the social security system in Slov-
enia is, therefore, the development of a sustainable, efficient and fair system of funding 
social security in the environment of the expected further ageing of the population. Spe-
cial emphasis is being put on the pension system due to its weight in the system of public 
finances; therefore it is also the focus of our research.
Due to increasingly perceptible unfavourable demographic developments it beca-
me obvious in Slovenia in the 1990s that the pension legislation as it had been to date 
would not be able to sustain the pressure. This became distinctly obvious in 1996, when 
the state pension fund needed additional financing from the central budget for the first 
time. This was enough to start intense preparations for the Slovenian pension reform, 
which was adopted in the form of the 1999 Pension and Disability Insurance Act (PDIA) 
and has been implemented from 1 January 2000. With the gradual implementation of the 
1999 PDIA, the second pension pillar is becoming increasingly important on account of 
the first pension pillar. This means that people will become less dependent on the pensi-
on from the first pillar as soon as they retire. However, since the second pension pillar in 
mainly voluntary in Slovenia, there are reservations regarding whether the present amo-
unt of supplementary pension saving will be sufficient to compensate for the deteriorati-
on of rights derived from the first pension pillar.
In the present analysis we are interested in the effects of varying the parameters of 
the current Slovenian pension system and introducing mandatory supplementary pension 
insurance in Slovenia on the welfare of different generations and on the sustainability of 
public finances. To achieve this, the Slovenian economy is analyzed with an overlapping-
generations general equilibrium (OLG-GE) model, supplemented with a generational acco-
unts (GA) model. Stress is laid on the Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987) type OLG-GE model, 
which is the most developed version of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. 
The SIOLG 2.0 model (Verbič, 2007; 2007a) makes possible analysis of the intra-gene-
rational and inter-generational redistribution effects of the potential outcomes of different 
strategies of public financing aimed at achieving sustainable long-term economic growth 
and social development. It also enables monitoring and anticipation of effects of unfavo-
urable demographic developments on the volume of social transfers to the population.
The aim of the present article is to evaluate three crucial questions regarding the Slo-
venian pension system. The first one refers to whether the burden of the pension reform 
will be borne by the already retired generations and the elderly in general, or the young 
generations, active in the future. The second question relates to the volume of current se-
cond pillar saving in Slovenia and its significance for compensating the reduced rights 
from the mandatory pension insurance of insured persons and pensioners. The last que-
stion refers to whether the increased retirement age and the adjusted pension growth with 
respect to wage growth, enacted by the 1999 PDIA and its subsequent amendments, will 
enable long-term pension system sustainability.
It was established that while young generations and new generations will lose from 
the pension reform, even complete implementation of the reform might not be sufficient 323
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to compensate unfavourable demographic developments. The volume of supplementary 
pension saving is insufficient at present in Slovenia to compensate for the deterioration of 
rights from the first pension pillar. Not only is the participation in the (voluntary) second 
pillar insufficient, but, and particularly, the premia are too low. The level of expected de-
ficit of the PAYG-financed state pension fund seems to be worrying, though higher acti-
vity level among the elderly would subsequently increase the volume of contributions to 
the first pension-pillar, thus also reducing the state pension fund deficit.
The outline of the article is as follows. In Chapter 2 the developments in the Sloveni-
an pension system from the 1990s onwards are explained in some detail, while in Chapter 
3 a short description of the OLG general equilibrium model of the Slovenian economy is 
presented. In Chapter 4 some of the simulation results are presented, with special focus 
on welfare effects in Slovenia, supplementary pension insurance in Slovenia and effects 
of the state pension fund deficit on the sustainability of Slovenian public finances. In the 
final chapter we summarize the central findings of the article.
2 Representation of Developments in the Slovenian Pension System
The Republic of Slovenia inherited the legislation of its pension system, which was 
based on inter-generational contract and is therefore a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, 
from the former Yugoslavia. After Yugoslavia splintered into newly independent coun-
tries at the beginning of the 1990s, transformation from workers’ self-management to a 
modern market economy was initiated in Slovenia, thus requiring the formation of new 
markets and taking market rules into account. However, the consequences of bankruptcy 
of firms, economic recession and restructuring of the business sector, all resulting from 
economic transformation, were “solved” at the same time in order to preserve social sta-
bility by mass early retirement.
After Slovenia’s independence in 1991, the new pension legislation was adopted so-
mewhat behind schedule in 1992, when the restructuring was for the most part already fi-
nished. Even the rise of the retirement age was therefore not able to put a brake on early 
retirement pressure. Because the price of additional years of service was low and there-
fore not consistent with actuarial principles, the purchase of additional years of seniori-
ty was a common phenomenon. Consequently, the increase in actual retirement age was 
modest and very close to the minimum retirement age. The ratio between the number of 
insured persons and the number of pensioners has been relatively steady over the last de-
cade (Stanovnik, 2002), although this stability is somewhat misleading for the new pen-
sion legislation introduced additional categories of insured persons1.
Legislative modifications adopted in 1992 are partially responsible also for the large 
increase of pension expenditure of the PAYG-financed state pension fund, i.e. the Insti-
tute for Pension and Disability Insurance (IPDI), in the same year. Namely, with the new 
Pension and Disability Insurance Act the IPDI was compelled to pay contributions for he-
alth insurance for pensioners, hence contributing at least one additional percentage point 
1 Evident examples of introducing additional categories of insured persons are “voluntarily insured persons” 
and “unemployed persons receiving unemployment benefits” for whom the contributions are paid by the National 
Employment Office.324
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to the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP. After 1992 the pension expenditure, measu-
red as percentage of GDP, somewhat stabilized at the level of 11 per cent. This could 
have been a sign of financial stabilization of the IPDI; however things took a drastic turn 
for the worse, as we will find out hereinafter. Until 1996 all extensive increases of pensi-
on expenditure were financed by increasing the pension contribution rate. As a result the 
(joint employer and employee) pension contribution rate rose from 22.55 per cent of the 
gross wage in 1989 to 31 per cent of the gross wage in 1995. Finally, in 1996 the Gover-
nment of the Republic of Slovenia decided to lower the employer pension contribution 
rate from 15.5 per cent of the gross wage to 8.85 per cent of the gross wage in order to in-
crease the competitiveness of the Slovenian economy.
The year 1996 hence represents a decisive moment, since the until then financially 
autonomous state pension fund demonstrated a deficit for the first time, which was after 
that filled up every year until 2004 with so-called “generalized” transfers from the central 
budget in order to maintain social stability. Transfers of funds from the central government 
budget to the IPDI indeed existed prior to 1996, but were only intended for financing ad-
ditional obligations of the government, such as pensions of farmers, policemen, customs 
officers and World War II combatants. Now the government actually committed itself to 
partially financing pensions that were primarily established on actuarial principles and 
were before 1996 entirely funded with the contributions of the active population. Until the 
economic transformation, relatively favourable pension figures become insupportable in 
just a few years. One should certainly add that the effects of demographic changes on the 
social security system are yet to be observed in the subsequent years.
The decrease of employer pension contributions was thus a “suitable” occasion for 
the extreme measure of the transfer-funding of the pension system. The insolvency of 
the pension system therefore passed by unnoticed by the general public, but the consequ-
ences of the pension deficit can be seen in the structure of the Slovenian budget, where 
there are fewer funds available for investments and for research and development. Yet 
the economic situation is commonly not perceived to be so pessimistic. The fiscal positi-
on was relatively favourable for the whole time and certainly the most promising among 
the new EU member states; the budget deficit was relatively low in the last decade des-
pite the difficult situation in the first years of economic transition, hence the public debt 
increased only moderately.
The problem, which had by that time drawn the attention of economists of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the World Bank, was properly addressed with the preparati-
on of the White Paper on the subject in 1997, which led to the adoption of new PDIA in 
1999. The implementation of this law started on 1 January 2000 and will be completed in 
2024. The pension system has become more complex than ever before; partially due to 
difficult negotiations in the government coalition, but mainly because of tiresome nego-
tiations between management and labour (Stanovnik, 2002). The main characteristic of 
the new pension legislation in comparison with the former legislation is path-dependen-
cy, which appears to be a universal feature of the predominantly gradualistic reforms of 
the Slovenian economic system. In addition, the transitional periods are lengthy, so the 
actual values of the parameters of the present three-pillar pension system in Slovenia con-
verge only gradually to the final values.325
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Statutory retirement age under the 1999 PDIA, which guarantees insured persons re-
tirement benefits, dependent only on completed years of service (without deductions), is 
63 years for men and 61 years for women. This criterion is to be increased from 58 years 
and 6 months in 2000 by 6 months per annum for men and from 53 years and 4 months 
in 2000 by 4 months per annum for women. However, an individual can retire as early as 
58 and receive pension without deductions if he or she has fulfilled the full pension qu-
alifying period, which is 40 years of service for men and 38 years of service for women. 
The transitional period terminates at the end of 2008 for men and at the end of 2022 for 
women. The minimum pension qualifying period is still 15 years of service. The retire-
ment age can be decreased for every child, biological or adopted, brought up and suppor-
ted by the insured person for at least for five years.
There is more consideration given in the 1999 PDIA to actuarial fairness, for the sy-
stem of incentives and disincentives was adopted in the case of retirement before and after 
fulfilment of the retirement eligibility criteria, respectively. That is, for all insured per-
sons without a full pension qualifying period, who have retired before 63 (men) and 61 
(women) years of age, the pension decreases accordingly for every month missing until the 
statutory retirement age. If, on the contrary, the insured pension remains employed after 
attaining the statutory retirement age and the full pension qualifying period, the pension 
accordingly increases for every month completed after the statutory retirement age. In-
centives and disincentives are added or subtracted by 1.5 percentage points of the accru-
al rate for every year of service added or missing, respectively.
The calculation of pensions is less favourable for insured persons under the 1999 
PDIA. The old-age pension is calculated from the pension base in per cent, depending on 
number of completed years of service; 35 per cent in the case of men and 38 per cent in 
the case of women for the first 15 years of service, and 1.5 per cent for each additional 
year of service irrespective of gender. Under the proviso that the insured person is not su-
bjected to pension disincentives, the pension in the case of a full pension qualifying peri-
od amounts to 72.5 per cent of the pension base, instead of the previous 85 per cent (1992 
PDIA). Since the pension base under the 1999 PDIA is calculated out of best 18 conse-
cutive years of service instead of the previous best 10 consecutive years of service (1992 
PDIA), the decrease in pensions is even higher. However, the most complex procedures 
of the 1999 pension legislation are the revaluation of pension bases and indexation of pen-
sions (cf. Stanovnik, 2004). Revaluation of the pension base in the Slovenian pension sy-
stem involves a procedure of recalculating the sources of pensionable income in the best 
18 consecutive years of service using a vector of revalorization coefficients, in order to 
obtain the pension base. It is actually an instrument in the pension system, used for obta-
ining horizontal equity between existing and new pensioners. Indexation of the pension, 
on the other hand, is a procedure of adjusting retirement benefits to existent economic 
developments in the country using a complex set of rules, where consumer price index is 
the floor and wage index is the ceiling for the growth rate of pensions.
It has to be emphasized that in 2005 the Government of the Republic of Slovenia in-
troduced several changes to the 1999 PDIA that were aimed at increasing the pensions 
(in real terms). The most important among then was the introduction of full indexation of 
pensions that is being carried out twice a year (in February and in November). Additio-326
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nally, the changes of pension legislation include increases in the level of the pensioner’s 
recreation grant and the lowering of the eligibility requirements for the survivor’s pensi-
on. These provisions, especially the introduction of full indexation of pensions, will un-
doubtedly have substantial negative long-term effects on controlling the expenditure of 
the system of public finances.
The 1999 PDIA introduced a number of elements that improved horizontal equity in 
the system (cf. Stanovnik, 2002). The gender divide regarding eligibility and benefits was 
considerably narrowed. Not only were accrual rates equalized, but the eligibility criteria 
for women are now closer to those for men. Nonetheless, even greater emphasis was laid 
on the principle of vertical equity or “solidarity”. Thus the ratio between two comparable 
pensions2 can not exceed 4:1, which is less than the prior ratio of 4.8:1 (1992 PDIA). In-
stead of an explicit minimum and maximum pension, the Slovenian pension system in-
cludes a minimum and maximum pension base; the former is set nominally, yet amoun-
ted to approximately 62.5 per cent of the average net wage in 2000, while the latter is four 
times the minimum pension base. A further redistributive element lies in the fact that so-
cial security contributions are not capped.
Another very important innovation of the 1999 pension legislation is the adjustment 
of pension growth of the existing pensioners to entry pensions of new pensioners, which 
amounts approximately to –0.6 percentage points per annum. This means that pensions 
of existing pensioners are being decreased, taking account of the lower pensions of new 
entrants. There was an initiative made to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slo-
venia for review of this article, but the Court ruled in December 2003 that the article is 
consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. Such an outcome is particu-
larly important, since this modification of the pension legislation represents a large share 
of the overall effects of the pension reform and also has a significant positive effect on 
managing the expenditure of the pension system.
The younger existing and new generations will evidently have to pay higher contri-
butions for the same or a lower pension. This will occur not only due to a fall in the re-
placement rate and the effect of partial indexation of pensions between 2000 and 2005, 
but primarily due to growth in the dependency ratio as a consequence of aging (see Figu-
re 1). For the old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of persons above 64 years of age to 
people aged 20-64, is projected to increase from 22.0 per cent in 2000 to 48.2 per cent in 
2040. The projected overall dependency ratio will adjust accordingly, which means that 
the financial burden imposed on employed persons, represented by the non-active per-
sons, will increase significantly. In addition, the younger existing and new generations 
will have to compensate for a relatively lower level of welfare with supplementary pen-
sion insurance.
The 1999 PDIA enabled the development of supplementary pension saving within the 
second pillar. In Slovenia the second pillar consists of supplementary pension insurance, 
which can be broken down to: (1) individual and collective, (2) voluntary and mandatory, 
and (3) based on employee or employer payments. Following significant consolidation 
2 Comparable pensions exist when two pensioners enter the pension system under the same conditions and both 
have full pension qualifying period.327
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Source: Demographic projections prepared for SIOLG 2.0; own calculations.
on the pensions market in the first half of this decade, the first and third classification can 
be taken as practically the same and one can speak of individual supplementary pension 
insurance as insurance based on employee payments, and collective supplementary pen-
sion insurance as insurance based on employer payments. Distinguishing between whet-
her participation is mandatory and the type of scheme is somewhat more difficult; indi-
vidual supplementary pension insurance is voluntary, while collective supplementary in-
surance may be mandatory or voluntary.
According to the current pension legislation, the second pillar includes insurance 
companies and pension companies as well as the state system. It covers private professi-
onal schemes financed from employee contributions and their employers. Participation 
in the first pillar is a condition for inclusion in the second pillar. The investment finan-
cing system represents the collection of funds in personal pension accounts with the pur-
pose of providing the insured persons with an additional pension on reaching a set age, 
or in other cases defined in the pension scheme. Monthly contributions gain interest at an 
agreed rate, or based on the profit the fund manager generates from investments. There is 
a minimum return requirement for pension funds, requiring them to provide at least 40% 
of the average annual interest rate on long-term government bonds.
Insured persons participating in voluntary supplementary pension insurance schemes 
can claim tax relief, if the pension scheme is on the approved list at the Ministry of Labo-
ur, Family and Social Affairs. According to the Act, value added tax is not paid on pre-
mia, and they are also exempt from 6.5% of insurance service tax. The tax relief on a pre-328
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mium paid by an insured person works by reducing the personal income tax base by the 
amount the insured person pays for voluntary supplementary pension insurance. Howe-
ver, the reduction of the personal income tax base is limited. The premium an employer 
pays for an insured person is not counted in that person’s income tax base. The pension is 
included in the income tax base in the year in which the beneficiary receives payment of 
the pension, while the premium paid by the employer is recognised for tax relief on cor-
porate income tax, but it does not count as wages paid nor are contributions paid on it. 
Experience to date with collective schemes indicates that employers finance most of the 
premium or even the entire premium.
The pension scheme manager is eligible for reimbursement of entry costs from premia 
paid, of exit costs and to an annual management commission. The entry costs are calcu-
lated as a percentage of the paid premium, and reduce the paid premium. The entry costs 
are calculated as a percentage of the surrender value, and reduce the surrender value. The 
commission for managing an active fund is defined as a percentage of the average net 
annual value of mutual fund assets and reduces the fund’s actual return. The Minister of 
Finance prescribes the maximum permitted percentages for these costs; at present these 
stand at 5.5% for entry costs; exit costs at 1%, and the management commission at 1.5%. 
Administrative costs are high therefore, though the trend is for them to fall.
The second pillar of the Slovenian pension system has undoubtedly undergone con-
siderable growth, as in mid-2006 over half the active working population was already in-
cluded in voluntary pension insurance. However, most of these insured persons were in-
volved via collective insurance, while the individual pension saving segment is marginal. 
Civil servants represent a significant proportion, though they pay the minimum premi-
um. In November 2005 439,280 insured persons were included in supplementary pensi-
on insurance, but 167,363 of them were civil servants with a minimum pension insurance 
premium. Overall, the key worrying indicator of progress in supplementary pension in-
surance in Slovenia is the value of paid premia. As this analysis indicates, there is a large 
gap between the actually paid premium for supplementary pension insurance and the tar-
get premium value that would enable compensation of effects of the pension reform on 
the welfare of the elderly. Below, the article will present the consequences this problem 
may pose in the future.
3 Description of the OLG-GE Model of the Slovenian Economy
The SIOLG 2.0 model is a dynamic overlapping-generations general equilibrium 
model of the Slovenian economy, based on social accounting matrix (SAM), data on de-
mographic structure of the population, expected future demographic developments, cha-
racteristics of Slovenian households, and decomposition of households within generati-
ons (cf. Verbič et al., 2006; Verbič, 2007). The model has been developed with the very 
intention of analyzing the sustainability of the Slovenian public finances, though it can be 
used to analyze any part or any sector of the economy.
The starting points of the OLG-GE model are the life cycle theory of consumption 
by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and the permanent income hypothesis by Friedman 
(1957), which are actually special cases of the more general theory of intertemporal allo-329
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cation of consumption (Deaton, 1992). Unlike in the Keynes theory of behaviour of con-
sumption and savings, based only on current income, in the OLG-GE model consumpti-
on and savings are derived from intertemporal optimization behaviour and are therefore 
dependent on full lifetime income. In the simplest case of unchanged income until retire-
ment (cf. Modigliani, 1986), consumers save during their active lifetime and spend their 
savings after retirement in order to maintain unchanged consumption. Retirement is the-
refore raison d’etre for saving.
Overlapping-generations general equilibrium models represent the pinnacle of dyna-
mic CGE modelling. OLG-GE modelling was established and promoted by Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987) and is based on detailed decomposition of the consumption side of the 
model. Namely, unlike in the Ramsey-type models the consumers live a finite length of 
time, but long enough to live at least one period with the next generations of consumers. 
Determination of consumers by their birth cohort enables analysis of inter-generational 
effects, which makes OLG-GE models especially valuable for analysis of tax policies, 
pension policies and other social policies.
The dynamic general equilibrium model SIOLG 2.0 comprises not only the standard 
model structure of a national economy, but also the demographic block and the pensi-
on block, within the framework of which the first and the second pillar of the Slovenian 
pension system are modelled. Since the model incorporates most of the contemporary te-
chniques of CGE modelling, the arrears in this field in Slovenia compared to the rest of 
the world have practically been eliminated. That is, the model is built within the gene-
ral algebraic modelling system (GAMS), which has become both the most widely used 
programming language and the most widespread computer software for the constructi-
on and solving of large and complex CGE models (cf. GAMS Development Corporati-
on, 2007; 2007a).
Within the GAMS framework, the dynamic general equilibrium model is written 
in Mathiesen’s (1985) formulation of the Arrow-Debreu (1954) equilibrium model, i.e. 
as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). The key advantage of this formulation is 
the compact presentation of the general equilibrium problem, which is achieved by trea-
ting variables implicitly and thus significantly reducing the computation time for higher-
dimensional models. Namely, the mathematical program includes equalities as well as 
inequalities, where the complementarity slackness holds between system variables and 
system conditions (cf. Rutherford, 1995a; Böhringer et al., 2003). Functions of the model 
are written in Rutherford’s (1995) calibrated share form, a reasonably straightforward al-
gebraic transformation, which nevertheless considerably simplifies the calibration of the 
model (cf. Böhringer et al., 2003; Balistreri and Hillberry, 2003). To solve the model, i.e. 
to achieve convergence, a recent version of the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 2000) 
is used, which is renowned for its computational efficiency.
Consumers live in the model according to their expected length of life, i.e. their life 
expectancy at birth. Assuming that the life expectancy is approximately 80 years and that 
the active lifetime period starts at the age of 20, there are 60 generations in each period of 
the model. There is a new cohort of consumers born in each such period, thus increasing 
the population, while at the same time a number of consumers pass away and decrease the 330
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total population. Consumers are observed in five-year intervals within households, which 
maximize the expected lifetime utility subject to their income constraints, where one has 
to put the need to save for retirement and to support children. Households are differentia-
ted in the model according to year of birth, income and size; within each cohort, distincti-
on is made between couples without children and nuclear families with two children on 
average, and five income profiles representing different income brackets. Consequently, 
there are ten versions of the model altogether, which facilitates analysis of intra-genera-
tional effects of different economic policies.
The volume of labour and tlabour productivity growth are given exogenously. Chan-
ges in wages are reflected in changes of the labour supply. Consumption of households 
with children is additionally corrected due to extra cost per child, where the children are 
born in the childbearing age of the woman or, to be precise, the household, i.e. in the age 
bracket of 20-40 years. In the first ten years after retirement the household is composed 
of two persons and afterwards of one adult. Saving decisions of households affect inves-
tment decisions of firms in the capital markets and thus future production. The effects as-
cribed herein have recurrent effects on the product market through decreasing prices and 
on the labour market through higher productivity, leading to higher wages and finally hi-
gher incomes of households. Both effects can be analyzed quite straightforwardly with a 
dynamic OLG-GE model.
The perfect foresight assumption in the forward-looking model specification implies 
the ability of households to perform intertemporal optimization of the present value of en-
tire future consumption. In other words, the consumers have full information at their dis-
posal, adopt on average the right decisions and are familiar with future modifications of 
key economic indicators, which is the quintessence of rational expectations. They are able 
to anticipate new policies and to prepare themselves for future changes. The assumption 
of equilibrium in all markets and assumption of achieved sustainable economic growth 
enable analysis of different scenarios, which cause deviations from the reference growth 
path and changes in macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators. This is especially im-
portant when analyzing social security, because it makes possible projecting the effects of 
demographic changes on the social security system. For this we have three variants of de-
mographic projections available; the low variant combines lower fertility with lower life 
expectancy and lower net migration, while the high variant combines higher fertility with 
higher life expectancy and higher net migration than in the reference medium variant.
On the other hand, the assumption of perfect foresight is also valid for firms, which 
maximize profits in the environment of perfect competition. Technology is given by the 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. The number of production 
sectors in the model is dependent on availability of the input-output table for the base year, 
which means that there are 60 sectors of the standard classification of activities (SCA) 
available for discretionary aggregation. Government spending is dependent on economic 
growth and growth of the population, and is financed with revenues from personal inco-
me tax, corporate income tax, value-added tax and import duties. Sources of revenue of 
the Slovenian system of public finances represent various possibilities of funding diffe-
rent economic policies in the simulation phase of the modelling.331
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The modelling of the first pension pillar was designed to capture the key pension sy-
stem parameters that are usually the subject of modification within pension reforms. The 
emphasis is on the cash flow of the mandatory pension insurance institution, the relati-
onship between the pension base and pensions, and the process of adjustment of pensi-
on growth with respect to wage growth. The modelling of the second pillar is focused on 
the implementation of the liquidity constraint. For this purpose the so-called total pensi-
on was introduced, representing the sum of the pension from the first and second pillars, 
where at every point households adjust the scope of their labour supply and their current 
consumption towards a target total pension. This creates a certain volume of supplemen-
tary pension saving, which can be treated as mandatory supplementary pension insurance, 
if the target total pension is defined at a level dissimilar to the reference level.
The SIOLG 2.0 dynamic general equilibrium model is closed using the Armington 
(1969) assumption of imperfect substitutability, where the commodities are separated by 
its source on domestic and imported products. Demand for imported products is derived 
from cost minimization criterion of firms and utility maximization criterion of consumers. 
As regards the export side of the model, domestically produced products are sold at home 
and abroad, but are nevertheless treated as imperfect substitutes. Slovenia is assumed to 
be a small open economy, implying that the changes in the volumes of imports and ex-
ports do not affect the terms of trade. International capital flows are endogenous, given 
the intertemporal balance of payments constraint.
4 Results of the Simulations
We commence with an analysis of welfare effects in Slovenia, followed by an anal-
ysis of supplementary pension saving in Slovenia; the chapter concludes by analyzing ef-
fects of the IPDI deficit on the sustainability of Slovenian public finances.
For the purpose of welfare analysis we use the Hicks equivalent variations (HEV) 
as a measure of change in the welfare of generations. Equivalent variations can be defi-
ned as the equivalent percentage change in full lifetime resources needed in the reference 
scenario to produce the same level of welfare under counterfactual scenarios. A positive 
value means that a generation will gain from switching from the reference scenario to a 
counterfactual scenario. The inter-generational redistribution effects for the current pen-
sion system parameter values in Slovenia, i.e. retirement age of 60 years and full (100 per 
cent) indexation of pensions, are shown in Figure 2.
At first glance, Figure 2 shows that if the pension system is funded with revenues 
from value-added tax (VAT), future generations will gain. It is obvious that in this sce-
nario the elderly will lose, as they have to pay more value-added tax in comparison with 
the reference scenario (REFER); they will be forced to bear a larger burden of the present 
value of public expenditure. In the case in which the pension system is funded with reve-
nues from labour income tax (LABS), all future generations will lose, as they alone will 
need to bear the burden of public expenditure.
Funding the pension system with revenues from value-added tax appears to be a so-
mewhat better alternative than funding the pension system with pension contributions, 332
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which can be explained as follows. Replacement of social security contributions with re-
venues from value-added tax improves the financial situation of young generations, for 
the consumption of the elderly is taxed additionally. Since young generations have a lower 
marginal propensity to consume than the elderly, after the tax reform their consumpti-
on decreases, whilst their supply of labour has to increase. Total consumption therefore 
decreases, whereas the total labour supply increases; savings increase and higher capital 
stock leads to higher GDP.
As value-added tax rate is raised over time, making consumption in the future more 
expensive, the value-added tax acts like a corporate income tax. In the case in which the 
pension system is funded with revenues from value-added tax, there is a substantial in-
crease in labour supply. This is to a lesser extent also true in the case of pension system 
funding from the revenues from labour income tax. People will not only work more, they 
will also work longer. The retired generations suddenly have to pay an increased tax on 
their consumption. As they live on their savings, the only way to keep their consumption 
at an unchanged level is by providing additional labour to the labour market, i.e. by reti-
ring later. Correspondingly, a rising labour income tax rate will change the relative inter-
temporal prices of leisure. The future price of leisure will fall relatively to the price of cu-
rrent leisure, inducing a substitution of future with current labour supply.
The reduction in the income of older generations as a consequence of the pension re-
form can by compensated for by supplementary pension insurance. The level of savin-
gs required in the mandatory second pillar depends primarily on the amount of the target 
total pension, which comprises the pension from the mandatory pension insurance (first 
pillar), and the pension from the supplementary pension insurance (second pillar), and 
on mandatory pension insurance parameters. Those worth highlighting are the retirement 
age, and the wage indexation of pensions from mandatory pension insurance. A distincti-
Figure 2   Welfare effects in Slovenia in the case of applying different sources of 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0.333
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Figure 3   Supplementary pension savings required in order to keep the total pension at 































































Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0.
   Reference case     Total pension at the 2005 level
   Total pension at the 2000 level
on must be made between saving in the second pillar, which is required to compensate for 
the overall effects of the 1999 pension reform (which only came into effect from 2000) 
on mandatory pension insurance, and saving in the second pillar which is only required 
to compensate for key changes in pension reform in 2005 (coming into effect in the same 
year). Both are defined in the model by the proportion of the net wage allocated to saving 
in the second pillar of the pension system.
Figure 3, which relates to the retirement age of 60 years and full wage indexation 
of pensions, indicates that second pillar saving required to achieve the given target total 
pension is falling along with a reduction in household age, while it remains stable in the 
base period, and is constant for new generations of the household. This is to be expected 
given the assumptions in the model (households start saving in the second pension pillar 
in 2000) that older generations have less time to compensate for the effects of the pensi-
on reform with additional pension saving, hence making the required saving level higher. 
Compensating for the total effects of the pension reform requires a higher level of savings 
than needed to compensate for the changes in pension legislation alone, so the first liqu-
idity constraint curve lies above the second. The saving required for the new generation 
to compensate for the total effects of the pension reform is 8.48% of the net wage, while 
compensating for the changes in the pension legislation from 2005 would require savings 
of 4.97% of the net wage. The reference saving in the second pillar is very low in Slove-
nia, which is in accordance with the supplementary pension insurance profiles construc-
ted for Slovenia (Verbič, 2007: 214-221).334
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Figure 4   Expected change in the supplementary pension savings required in order to 
keep the total pension at the given level if retirement age is increased to 65 
years and indexation of pensions is unchanged.




































































 Total pension at the 2000 level    Total pension at the 2005 level
Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0.
Figure 4 indicates the changes required in second pillar saving by age cohort to achi-
eve the required target total pension when raising the retirement age by five years, while 
retaining full wage indexation. It can be ascertained that the development of both liquidi-
ty constraint curves is similar to the preceding case, while the required saving level to ac-
hieve the given target full pension is significantly lower. Therefore, the saving required 
for the new generation to compensate for the total effects of the pension reform is 5.82% 
of the net wage, while compensating for the changes in the pension legislation from 2005 
requires savings of 3.54% of the net wage. Increasing the retirement age by an additional 
year therefore reduces the additional second pillar saving required to achieve the given 
target pension by 0.4 percentage points of the net wage.
The model simulations indicate that the pension fund deficit, with the current pen-
sion reform applying, i.e. given retirement ages of 61 (women) and 63 years (men) and 
full wage indexation, would grow to 9.9% of GDP by 2040. To understand the dimensi-
ons of the forecast growth in pension expenditure, it is sufficient to mention the fact that 
over the period 1947 to 1951, when the pension system started functioning, the total pro-
portion of the IPDI funds in GDP was just 2.5% (Stanovnik and Kukar, 1995). Meanwhi-
le, at the beginning of the 1990s, due to a drastic fall in the number of employees and the 
subsequent steep rise in pensioners, pension expenditure had already passed the 10% of 
GDP milestone, with the figure settling at around 13% of GDP following the implemen-
tation of the 1999 pension reform.
It should be pointed out that the selection of the method for indexing pensions has 
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Table 1.   Estimates of total balance of the state pension fund (in % of GDP) using 
different assumptions about retirement age and indexation level of pensions
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Retirement age of 60 years,
  100% indexation of pensions
–4.1 –6.0 –8.9 –12.0 –13.7
Retirement age of 60 years,
  80% indexation of pensions
–3.8 –4.7 –6.3   –8.5   –9.2
Retirement age of 61/63 years,
  100% indexation of pensions
–3.6 –4.6 –6.9   –9.9 –11.7
Retirement age of 61/63 years,
  80% indexation of pensions
–3.3 –3.5 –4.8   –6.6   –7.5
Retirement age of 65 years,
  100% indexation of pensions
–3.0 –1.9 –3.8   –6.2   –8.1
Retirement age of 65 years,
  80% indexation of pensions
–2.8 –0.9 –1.9   –3.5   –4.5
Source: Calculations using Generational Accounts model (2007); cf. Verbič (2007:281).
Figure 5   Expected change in the deficit of the Slovenian state pension fund in the case 
in which the mandatory second pillar keeps the total pension at the 2000 
level (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation)
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tions presented above, the transition from full to partial (80%) indexation of pensions to 
wage represents a reduction in the pension fund deficit in 2040 of 3.3 GDP percentage 
points. Increasing the retirement age has an even more beneficial effect on the pension 
fund balance (Table 1); the transition from a retirement age of 60 years to 65 years in the 
counterfactual scenario represents a reduction in the pension fund deficit in 2040 of as 336
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much as 3.7 GDP percentage points. Furthermore, the higher retirement age also defers 
the occurrence of an additional pension fund deficit by approximately ten years (Verbič, 
2007, pp. 260-262).
And finally, we are interested in the impact of a mandatory second pension pillar on 
the first pillar, i.e. the effect on the balance of cash flows of the IPDI. If employees in-
crease second pillar saving, the value of their labour supply has to increase or they have 
to reduce the value of their current consumption. If the first option is selected, their gross 
income from the employment on which social insurance contributions (including pensi-
on and disability insurance contributions) are paid will increase, which could lead to a 
reduction in the IPDI deficit. As indicated by Figure 5, keeping the target full pension at 
the level it was before the 1999 pension reform came into effect would actually lead to 
this phenomenon. The pension fund deficit would be reduced due to the participation of 
employees in a (targeted) mandatory second pillar by between 0.80 and 1.38 GDP per-
centage points, depending on the year selected.
5 Conclusion
The burden of introducing the 1999 pension reform and its amendments will largely 
be borne by the young active generations and future generations on behalf of the already 
retired generations and the baby-boom generations that are starting to retire. Due to a fall 
in the replacement rate and the effect of partial indexation of pensions between 2000 and 
2005 on one hand, but primarily due to growth in the dependency ratio as a consequence 
of demographic aging on the other hand, the younger existing and new generations will 
have to pay higher contributions for the same or a lower pension, while to compensate 
for welfare with supplementary pension insurance they will have to reduce current con-
sumption and increase their labour supply.
The volume of current second pillar saving in Slovenia is too low to compensate for 
the reduction in rights from mandatory pension insurance. It is not only that inclusion in 
that form of insurance is too low, but, particularly, that the premia paid in are too low. 
The model simulations indicated that for a retirement age of 60 the saving required for 
the new generations to compensate for the total effects of the pension reform is approxi-
mately 8.5% of the net wage, while the changes in the pension legislation from 2005 can 
be compensated by savings of approximately 5.0% of the net wage. The reference (vo-
luntary) second pillar saving of the present new generations amounts to approximately 
0.4% of the net wage on average.
Clearly, alternative forms of saving for old age are not developing quickly enough to 
deal successfully in the long term with the problems of an aging population, so Slovenia 
will require additional measures at a number of levels to normalise the state of the pen-
sion system. The 1999 PDIA introduced incentives for retirement saving in funded sy-
stems, which could be subject to modifications. Another possible solution to deteriora-
ting economic circumstances of the elderly could be to reduce the difference between the 
minimum and maximum pension base by raising the former and reducing the latter. This 
would enable insured persons from lower income brackets and compel insured persons 337
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from middle and higher income brackets in Slovenia to save “voluntarily” for retirement 
in the context of the second pension pillar.
Ultimately, the enacted additional pension insurance, i.e. mandatory second pension 
pillar, could assist in the move towards a more rational reallocation of life-cycle consump-
tion and a more optimal labour supply. The consequent increased activity by insured per-
sons in the labour market would also lead to a greater volume of contributions for manda-
tory pension insurance, which would reduce the pension fund deficit. Should the increase 
and prolongation of activity turn out in the future to be insufficient, the enacted increase 
of retirement age (irrespective of gender) could remain the only reasonable alternative.
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